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Abstract
Workers are exposed to the risk of permanent disability. We rely on a dynamic
mechanism design approach to determine how imperfect information on health
should optimally be used to improve the trade-o¤between inducing the able to work
and providing insurance against disability. After deriving the rst-order conditions
to this problem, we calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and run a numerical
simulation. The government should o¤er back-loaded incentives and make strate-
gic use of the di¤erence between the age at which disability occurs and the age
of eligibility to disability benets. Also, the able who are (mistakenly) tagged as
disabled should be encouraged to work until some early retirement age. This makes
a decrease in the strictness of the disability test desirable which would reduce the
number of disabled who are not awarded the tag and, hence, improve insurance.
Finally, we show how the rst-best allocation of resources can asymptotically be
implemented by making strategic use of the disability test.
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curity
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1 Introduction
Two of the most pressing issues in public nance across industrialized nations are the
rising costs of providing disability insurance and pensions to an aging population. These
two problems are in fact closely related as disability insurance is often used as a stepping
stone towards retirement (Autor and Duggan, 2006; Li and Maestas, 2008). Furthermore,
both the disability insurance and pension programs can be seen as complementary ways
of providing insurance to workers against the risk that they lose their ability to earn
income from labor. Indeed, in the U.S., these two programs are the main pillars of the
"Social Security" system which is meant to provide security against the risk of being
unable to work.
The disability insurance program relies on imperfect information on health to provide
a decent income to those who are likely to be truly disabled. However, it is clearly not
possible to provide perfect insurance against the disability risk as some agents who are
truly disabled fail to qualify. Thus, systematic eligibility to old-age pensions beyond a
certain age is justied as another, complementary, way of providing insurance. Indeed,
this is what motivated Bismarck to invent pension programs as early as 1889.1
In 2007, the U.S. Social Security system provided income to almost 50 million individ-
uals for a total cost of $585 billion (4.2% of GDP) of which 9 million received disability
benets2 for a total cost of $99 billion (0.7% of GDP) (SSA 2008). By contrast, in 2007,
the total cost of unemployment insurance was only $32 billion, about a third of the size
of the disability insurance program. Most European countries have even larger disability
insurance programs (as a share of their GDP). Despite these gigantic numbers and the
potentially large welfare implications of the disability risk (Chandra and Samwick, 2006),
very little is known about the optimal design of insurance against this risk.
To approach this problem, we rely on a framework that incorporates two important
dimensions. First, we have a dynamic setup in order to capture the fact that disability
could potentially hit any worker at any age. Second, we assume that medical impair-
ments can only be imperfectly observed by the government. This assumption is hard
to dispute given that almost 70% of workers receiving disability insurance payments fall
into the following three categories: mental disorders (33.4%), musculoskeletal system and
connective tissue, e.g. back pain, (26.4%), and nervous system and sense organs (9.5%).
Our contribution is therefore to characterize the optimal provision of insurance against
the disability risk in a dynamic framework with imperfectly observable health. We how-
ever restrict ourselves to the risk of permanent disability. Our aim is to uncover the key
1There is also, of course, a leisure component to the provision of pensions which will be captured by
our theoretical framework.
27 million of those where disabled workers, which represents about 4.4% of the population between
the ages of 25 and 64. The other beneciaries are the spouses and children of disabled workers.
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qualitative and quantitative features that must be satised by an optimal policy.
Let us now describe our theoretical framework. At any age, a worker faces the risk
of being hit by an irreversible disability shock. The government would like to provide
insurance against disability while inducing the able to work up to a general retirement
age. To enhance the provision of insurance, the government could rely on its imperfect
information on health by giving higher consumption to those who seem to be unable to
work. More precisely, those who seem to be in poor health are "tagged"3 as disabled and
therefore eligible for this higher consumption level. Thus, the only information that the
government has about the health of an individual is whether or not this individual has
been awarded a tag.
Importantly, tagging is imperfect and some classication errors are unavoidable. Hence,
some workers who are able to work are awarded the tag, while others who are truly dis-
abled are rejected. Recognizing this problem, the government still wants to provide
the able and tagged with incentives to work. Thus, the optimal allocation of resources
is found by setting up a dynamic mechanism design problem where the able, whether
tagged or not, are induced to work until some retirement age to be determined. Inducing
the tagged to participate is costly, since they face a strong temptation to claim to be
disabled. Hence, they should only be induced to work up to an early retirement age.4
The rst-order conditions to the planners problem provide a number of qualitative
insights. First, as in some other dynamic contracting problems, the optimal allocation is
characterized by back-loaded incentives. The reward for participation is higher for more
experienced workers. Not only does it induce the old to participate, it also induces the
young who are motivated by the prospect of high consumption once they will have accu-
mulated a lot of work experience. The consumption of participating workers is therefore
increasing with age and jumps upward when a tag is awarded.
A more fundamental insight is that, when an agent stopped working before being
awarded the tag, the optimal policy exploits the di¤erence between the age at which this
agent stopped working, i.e. the age at which he claimed to be disabled, and the age at
which he was awarded the tag. The idea is that someone who claims to be disabled is
likely to say the truth if he becomes tagged shortly after stopping to work but is probably
lying if he remains untagged for a long time. The former should therefore be rewarded
with high consumption while the latter should be punished with low consumption. This
key insight, which is specic to a dynamic framework with imperfect tagging, shows how
the planner can use imperfect information on health in order to improve the trade-o¤
3The term was originally introduced by Akerlof (1978) who performed the rst analysis of the optimal
use of tagging in the design of welfare programs.
4As we argue in the text, such an early retirement age could be seen as a "health-dependent retirement
age". However, it should be emphasized that this retirement age depends on health as observed by the
government but only applies to the able, who are, by denition, in good health.
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between insurance and incentives to work.
To illustrate these features and to have a more quantitative sense of the main char-
acteristics of the optimal policy, we calibrate the model to U.S. data and perform a
numerical simulation. The rst nding that we obtain is that the implementation of the
optimal policy makes it desirable to decrease the strictness of the disability test so as
to reduce the number of disabled individuals who are not awarded the tag. However,
crucially, doing so is only desirable because the able and tagged are induced to work.
When such incentives are not provided, it becomes desirable to increase the strictness of
the disability test in order to reduce the number of able workers who are thrown out of
the labor force by the award of a tag. We also show that it is important to implement an
early retirement age for the tagged as inducing them to work until the general retirement
age would be excessively costly and could result in a welfare loss compared to a situation
where they do not work at all.
These numerical results are obtained assuming that the strictness of the disability
test is chosen to minimize the total number of classication errors (while allowing for a
preference between rejection and award errors). Although this is a natural and realistic
benchmark, it is interesting to characterize the optimal policy when the strictness of the
disability test at each age is directly under the control of the planner. We show that, in
this case, the rst-best allocation of resources can asymptotically be implemented. The
idea is to set a very high disability threshold after the retirement age, so that those who do
not become tagged are almost surely able to work, and to punish individuals who claimed
to be disabled in the past but fail to be awarded the tag. If the punishment is su¢ ciently
severe, no able worker would ever claim to be disabled; and, if the disability threshold
is su¢ ciently high, the punishment would almost never fall onto a truly disabled worker.
While it might not be realistic to believe that such an extreme policy is implementable in
practice, this result nevertheless suggests that signicant welfare gains can be obtained
by setting the disability threshold strategically and, hence, by moving beyond the mini-
mization of classication errors which, as we argue empirically, characterizes the current
U.S. policy.
It is important to emphasize that, in this paper, we exclusively focus on the deter-
mination of the optimal incentive-feasible allocation of resources. We do not investigate
how it could be implemented in a decentralized market economy where the government
is constrained to use scal instruments instead of directly choosing individualsconsump-
tion levels and labor supplies. Note that, while optimal allocations are typically unique,
there usually exist multiple ways of implementing them. Thus, in general, results about
optimal allocations are more robust than about their implementation.
Related Literature. Our paper builds on two strands of the literature. The rst focuses
on the optimal design of insurance against the occurrence of unobservable idiosyncratic
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shocks to productivity. More specically, we build on the seminal work of Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978) which characterizes the optimal provision of social insurance against the
risk of permanent disability when health is unobservable. As inducing the able to work
is costly, they nd that the general retirement age should be smaller than the rst-best
retirement age of the full-information economy. Thus, old-age pensions do not merely
allow people to enjoy leisure at the end of their lives, they should also be designed to
provide insurance against the risk of permanent disability.
Over the last decade, a renewed interest in the optimal provision of insurance against
productivity shocks has led to the emergence of the New Dynamic Public Finance liter-
ature. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) showed that, within this family of
problems, the optimal incentive-feasible allocation of consumption is always characterized
by inverse Euler equations. However, it is not possible to obtain such a general character-
ization of the optimal allocation of time between work and leisure. Thus, simulations of
the optimal allocation of resources have only been realized in special cases. Albanesi and
Sleet (2006) solved the optimal insurance problem when productivity shocks are i.i.d..
More recently, Farhi and Werning (2012) have been able to solve the AR(1) case. It turns
out that the case of permanent disability shocks à la Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) can
also be fully solved. Indeed, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) were the rst to perform a
numerical simulation of the optimal insurance policy with permanent disability shocks.
However, they only allowed for an intensive labor supply margin, which implies that able
workers never wish to retire (even though their working hours decline as their productiv-
ity falls). By contrast, following Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), we only have an extensive
labor supply margin, which eventually induces all agents to retire so as to enjoy leisure.5
The main contribution of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) is their demonstration that
the optimal allocation of resources can be implemented in a decentralized economy by an
asset test which species that an agent is eligible for disability benets if and only if his
assets are below a specic threshold. Their numerical simulation shows that implementing
the asset test generates a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 0.5% compared to the
optimal policy with hidden savings.
Within this literature, Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) showed that, for a broad
family of social insurance problems, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a linear
tax on wealth together with a social security system which consists of history-dependent
taxes or transfers after retirement. However, their paper focuses almost exclusively on
the implementation within a decentralized economy of an optimal allocation that they
do not fully characterize. Their approach to the optimal design of social security systems
5Note that Michau (2012) and Shourideh and Troshkin (2012) also perform numerical simulations of
an optimal policy with a retirement margin. However, both papers focus on redistribution across ex-ante
heterogeneous individuals and do not allow for permanent disability shocks.
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should therefore be seen as complementary to ours.
The second strand of the literature on which we build traces back to Akerlof (1978)
who argued that, in the presence of asymmetric information, incentive compatibility
constraints could be relaxed by relying on some publicly available information correlated
with agentsprivate information. This general principle naturally applies to disability
insurance and retirement programs, where health is the hidden information which the
government can imperfectly observe. Indeed, Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), Parsons
(1996) and Salanie (2002) showed that, even if the governments information is very
imperfect, welfare can be improved by enhancing the consumption of those who are
tagged as disabled. Our work is particularly related to that of Parsons (1996) which
stressed that the able who are mistakenly tagged as disabled should be incentivized to
work. However, all these models are static and none of them performs a numerical
simulation of the optimal policy. They therefore do not o¤er any quantitative evaluation
of the welfare gains that could be generated by the imperfect observability of health.
There has recently been renewed interest in the use of tagging for the optimal design
of insurance or redistribution policies. For example, it has been shown that signicant
welfare gains could be generated by making taxes dependent on age (Weinzierl, 2011),
on gender (Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2011) or even on height (Mankiw and
Weinzierl, 2010). However, given the signicant size of these welfare gains, it seems
puzzling that such tags are not more widely used in practice. Interestingly, Weinzierl
(2012) argues that concerns about horizontal equity, which follow from the equal sacrice
principle, imply that tags should only be used in practice if the information they provide
is strongly correlated with hidden productivity. He concludes that disability tags are
acceptable, while gender, race or height tags are not.
Our work combines these two strands of the literature on optimal social insurance by
introducing imperfect tagging into the dynamic mechanism design approach of Diamond
and Mirrlees (1978).
While there is a considerable literature on optimal unemployment insurance, relatively
little is known about the optimal design of disability insurance. In addition to the work
mentioned above, the literature nevertheless includes some important contributions on the
topic. Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2006) relied on a careful empirical analysis of
the tagging process to propose an optimal statistical screening rule which would result in
fewer classication errors. Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) considered an environment where
the government needs to impose some complexity into the system in order to obtain
imperfect information on health. This has the adverse consequence of reducing take-up.
They therefore characterize the optimal trade-o¤ between complexity and take-up. Low
and Pistaferri (2012) propose a structural model of labor supply in a life-cycle setting
where workers are subject to both disability and wage shocks. Relying on an empirical
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estimation of their structural parameters, they argue that decreasing the strictness of the
disability test would enhance social welfare. Thus, it is desirable to increase the number
of disabled workers who are awarded the tag, despite a resulting worsening of incentives.
In section 2, we present the theoretical model. We rst describe the setup, then
turn to the planners problem before giving the rst-order conditions that characterize
the optimal allocation of resources. Then, in the following section, we calibrate the
model. Section 4 is devoted to the numerical simulation of the optimal policy and to the
evaluation of the corresponding welfare gains. Finally, in section 5, we describe how the
rst-best allocation of resources can be implemented if the government sets the strictness
of the disability test strategically. The paper ends with a conclusion.
2 Model
This section describes our theoretical framework. We rst present the setup of our model,
then give the planners problem and, nally, describe the rst-order conditions which
characterize the optimal allocation of resources.
2.1 Setup
There is a mass 1 of agents who face a deterministic life span equal to H. Time is
continuous, which is necessary to be able to rely on a rst-order condition to determine
the retirement age. Everyone derives instantaneous utility u(c) from consuming c at a
given point in time, where u0() > 0, u00() < 0, lim
c!0+
u(c) =  1 and lim
c!0+
u0(c) = +1.6 At
a given age, an individual can either be able or disabled. Only the able can work. Their
productivity evolves deterministically over the life-cycle and is equal to t for a worker
of age t. Productivity is a continuous function of age and is minimal at H. We will later
assume, in the calibration section, that t follows an inverted U-shape. To generate a
retirement decision, we impose that labor supply is indivisible and that, at each instant,
workers face a xed utility cost b > 0 of working.7 Agents discount the future at rate .
Finally, the planner can transfer resources across time at an exogenous risk-free interest
rate which, for simplicity, is assumed to be equal to .
At the individual level, the only source of risk in this economy is the stochastic
6Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2013) have recently provided some evidence that the marginal
utility of consumption of the elderly declines as health deteriorates. However, we do not yet know
whether the marginal utility of consumption di¤ers between periods of employment and leisure. Thus,
for simplicity, our specication assumes a constant marginal utility of consumption across all states.
7It would be straightforward to add an intensive margin. Indeed, in a similar setup, Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006) only allowed for an intensive margin of labor supply. However, Liebman, Luttmer and
Seif (2009) provided some empirical evidence that most of the labor supply response to changes in the
level of Social Security benets occurs at the extensive margin.
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occurrence of disability shocks. Disability is an absorbing state which implies that once
a worker has been hit by the shock, he never regains his ability to work. The occurrence
of the shock over the life cycle is determined by a c.d.f. which is denoted by F (t), where
t 2 [0; H], while the corresponding p.d.f. is denoted by f(t). Thus, at age t a fraction
F (t) of the population is disabled.
In order to have a pure social insurance problem, with ex-ante identical individuals,
we shall assume that the planner attaches zero weight on those who became disabled
before starting to work.8 Such unfortunate individuals should certainly be taken care of,
but outside the Social Security system which we investigate. This reects the current
U.S. situation where eligibility to Social Security requires some employment history.
With a diminishing marginal utility of consumption, the rst-best allocation of re-
sources is characterized by the provision of full insurance against the disability risk.
Consumption should therefore be constant across all states and, hence, independent of
whether an individual is able to work or not. Able workers should eventually retire to
enjoy some leisure.
If health is private information, this allocation of resources is not incentive compatible
as able people have an incentive to masquerade as disabled in order to retire earlier and to
save the disutility cost of working. This led Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) to characterize,
within the above framework, the optimal provision of Social Security with unobservable
health. They found that the consumption level of the disabled should be su¢ ciently low
to induce the able to work. Furthermore, incentives are back-loaded, i.e. the disabled
should be provided with higher consumption if they stopped working at a more advanced
age. But the most remarkable feature of the optimal policy is that it puts everyone into
retirement before the rst-best retirement age. The intuition for this result is that there
are eventually so many disabled that it would be too costly, from a welfare perspective,
to push their consumption level down in order to induce the able to work.
However, the assumption of unobservable health is very strong. Indeed, in most coun-
tries, including the U.S., disability insurance programs do rely on imperfect information
on the work ability of their applicants. They typically run a medical test and "tag" as
disabled those whose health appears to be below some threshold. However, as the infor-
mation is imperfect, some errors are unavoidable leading to the occurrence of gaps and
leakages. Gaps occur when some disabled individuals remain untagged; while leakages
occur when some able are tagged.9
8When determining the planners optimal allocation, this is equivalent to imposing the normalization
F (0) = 0.
9In most of the existing literature on misclassications in disability insurance programs (see, e.g.,
Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust, 2006), rejection (award) error is referred to as the probability of
being disabled (able) conditional on being untagged (tagged), and type I (II) error as the probability
of being untagged (tagged) conditional on being disabled (able). We, in contrast, dene gaps as the
number of individuals who are disabled and untagged, and leakages as the number of individuals who
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Note that it would certainly be welfare-enhancing for the government to use more
detailed information on health. For instance, it could assign each disability applicant a
probability of being truly unable to work. However, for reasons which are beyond the
scope of our analysis, in the U.S., as in many other countries, the disability insurance
program relies on a simple tagging process where individuals are either classied as dis-
abled or not. We therefore follow most of the literature on the topic and constrain the
government to rely on a binary tagging process.
More formally, let  denote the outcome of the test for a given individual. Thus, 
could be thought of as his apparent health. Its c.d.f. over the population is GA() for
an able and GD() for a disabled. The respective p.d.f.s are denoted by gA() and gD().
An individual is tagged if his  falls below a threshold ^ which determines the disability
standard. Thus, an able individual is tagged with probability GA(^) and a disabled with
probability GD(^). Following Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), we assume that GA()
rst-order stochastically dominates GD(), i.e. GA() < GD() for all , and that the
two distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio condition, i.e. gA()=gD() is
increasing in . Furthermore, we assume that, for a given individual,  remains xed
throughout his life except for a drop when he becomes disabled. When determining the
disability standard ^, the government faces a trade-o¤ between the number of gaps and
of leakages. See Figure 1.
Figure 1: Trade-o¤ between gaps and leakages
Note that the share of disabled is very small among young individuals, but is much
larger among senior people. Thus, as age increases, leakages become a smaller concern,
while the opposite is true for gaps. We therefore assume an age-dependent disability
are able and tagged. Since there is a mass 1 of individuals, gaps is equivalent to the probability of being
disabled and untagged, and leakages to the probability of being able and tagged.
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standard equal to ^t at age t, which is non-decreasing with age.10 Hence, at age t, the
number of gaps is equal to [1 GD(^t)]F (t) and that of leakages to GA(^t)[1  F (t)].
We are now in a position to derive the joint p.d.f. of the ages at which people become
disabled and at which they become tagged. Note that the structure of the problem
implies that being tagged is an absorbing state. Let i and j stand for the ages at which
an individual becomes disabled and tagged, respectively. We can consider that i = H if
someone dies while still able and j = H if he dies untagged. Let f(i; j) denote the joint
p.d.f. of (i; j). From Bayeslaw:
f(i; j) = f(jji)f(i); (1)
where f(i) is the previously dened exogenous p.d.f. of ages at which people become
disabled. With an obvious abuse of notation, the p.d.f. of getting tagged at age j given
that disability occurs at i, for 0 < i < H, is given by:
f(jji) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
GA(^0) if j = 0
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
if 0 < j < i
GD(^i) GA(^i) if j = i
gD(^j)
d^j
dj
if i < j < H
1 GD(^H) if j = H
: (2)
A fraction GA(^0) of individuals obtain the tag at age 0. To understand the second and
fourth cases, i.e. 0 < j < i and i < j < H, note that the only way by which an agent
can become tagged if he does not simultaneously become disabled is that the disability
standard ^j increases su¢ ciently so that his own constant  falls below this threshold.
For an able worker, this occurs with probability GA(^j+")   GA(^j) over a time interval
of length ". The corresponding probability density is equal to
h
GA(^j+") GA(^j)
i
="
with " tending to 0. The same argument applies for a disabled. The third case, j = i,
gives the probability of becoming tagged when the disability occurs. This is equal to the
probability of being tagged once disabled, GD(^i), minus the probability of having already
been tagged before becoming unable to work, GA(^i). Thus, the p.d.f. f(i; j) is degenerate
since a mass of agents become disabled and tagged simultaneously. In fact, this seems
sensible as the occurrence of disability should certainly lead to a deterioration of the
apparent health observed by the government. Finally, the last case, j = H, corresponds
to the probability of dying untagged. For completeness, note that for someone dying
10Note that, for any given individual,  is only xed with respect to the distributions gA() and gD(),
but that these distributions could well shift over time. In particular, we might expect the apparent
health of both the able and disabled to deteriorate as people get older, which is not a problem provided
that both distributions shift by the same amount. It follows that the disability standard ^t is only
non-decreasing relative to gA() and gD().
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able, i = H, (2) simplies to:
f(jji = H) =
8>><>>:
GA(^0) if j = 0
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
if 0 < j < H
1 GA(^H) if j = H
: (3)
Here, the last three cases of (2) boil down to a single one, i.e. j = H.
Importantly, we will assume throughout this paper that able individuals do not know
the value of their xed . All they know is whether they are eligible for the tag or
not. This assumption implies that, conditional on remaining able to work, agents cannot
predict when they will become eligible for the tag. Note that the alternative benchmark,
where people would know their , would imply that they can predict at age 0 when they
would become eligible for the tag conditional on remaining able to work. One way to
think about our assumption is that people get a private medical check-up every year
and that their doctor advises them to apply for the tag once they become eligible for it.
It is important to emphasize that this approach provides a reduced form that captures
the dynamic trade-o¤ between gaps and leakages; it certainly does not pretend to give a
realistic representation of the very complicated process by which the true and apparent
health condition of an individual evolve over time.
Importantly, the structure of the model implies that increasing the number of medical
tests imposed on a given individual does not elicit additional information. By contrast,
Low and Pistaferri (2012) nd it desirable to increase the frequency of reassessments
(even though this only generates modest welfare gains). Crucially, they assume that the
outcomes of the tests are independent from each other. By contrast, our model implies
that once an individual has been awarded a tag, he remains eligible forever. Thus, the
amount of information that the government can obtain on the health of its citizens is not
fundamentally constrained by the cost of performing medical tests. For simplicity, we
therefore assume throughout that these costs are negligible.
2.2 Planners problem
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the expected lifetime utility of workers
at age 0 subject to a resource constraint and to a set of incentive compatibility con-
straints which ensure that the able choose to work (up to some retirement age). For each
individual, the planner observes his age and, if applicable, the age of award of the tag
and the age at which the individual stopped working. However, the planner cannot di-
rectly observe whether or not an individual is able to work as this is private information.
Hence, the age of occurrence of disability is only revealed by the incentive compatibil-
ity constraints (unless disability occurs after retirement). Before formally deriving the
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planners objective and constraints, we need to specify his control variables.
The rst set of control variables includes all the labor supply decisions which, here,
consist of the retirement ages of the able.11,12 The planner will make the retirement age
of each worker conditional on all the information that he has about him. The relevant
information set consists of whether the individual has been tagged and, if so, the age j
of the award. We denote by RU the retirement age of the untagged and by RT (j) the
retirement age of able workers who got tagged at age j.13 Note that those whose apparent
health is lower, i.e. who have a lower , will be tagged earlier. This implies that j is a
su¢ cient statistic for the apparent health of the able and tagged and, hence, RT (j) could
be seen as a health-dependent retirement age.
Parsons (1996) was the rst to emphasize that with only imperfect information on
health, and therefore the possibility of leakages, there is no reason to force all the tagged
to become inactive. While, in our dynamic setup, it might not be desirable to induce the
able and tagged to work until RU , the planner nevertheless has the exibility to induce
them to work until some earlier retirement ages given by fRT (j)gj2[0;RU).14 Inducing
the able and tagged to participate is not unrealistic. Indeed, in some countries, those
o¢ cially registered as disabled are o¤ered incentives to work, which could be seen as an
illustration of this. Obviously, this requires commitment from the planner who might be
tempted to remove the tag from those who reveal that they are able to work.
The remaining control variables are the consumption levels. Again, they should be
made conditional upon all the information that the planner has about each individual.
The consumption levels chosen by the planner are therefore a function of the age t of the
agent and, if applicable, of the age j of award of the tag and of the age r of retirement.
Note that an individual retires either when he becomes disabled or when he reaches
the retirement age (which is either equal to RU or to RT (j)). The planner therefore
needs to determine the consumption at age t of Working individuals who are Untagged,
cWU(t)
	
t2[0;RU), of Working individuals who are Tagged,

cWT (t; j)
	
j2[0;RU);t2[j;RT (j)), of
Non-working individuals who are Untagged,

cNU(t; r)
	
r2[0;RU ];t2[r;H], and,
nally, of Non-working individuals who are Tagged,

cNTN (r; j)
	
r2[0;RU ];j2(r;H] and
11The disabled trivially retire when they lose their ability to work.
12Note that, even if workers have low productivity when young, we do not allow them to postpone
entry into the labor force. One external justication for this is on-the-job learning, which makes early
work at low productivity an investment into the future. Hence, postponing entry does not increase the
starting productivity of a worker and age 0 could be seen as a normalization of the age at which work
begins. Thus, here, as in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), the retirement age summarizes the labor supply
decision of an individual.
13Clearly, those who only get tagged after RU retire at RU . We can therefore consider that RT (j) =
RU whenever j  RU .
14In theory, RT (j) could be larger than RU . However, given that it is more costly to induce a worker
to participate when he has been awarded a tag, we clearly expect RT (j) < RU . This is conrmed by
our numerical simulation.
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
cNTT (r; j)
	
j2[0;RU);r2[j;RT (j)]. In this last case, for reasons that will subsequently become
clear, we distinguish whether the individual retired rst, r < j, or was tagged either
rst or when retiring, j  r. Note that these last two consumption functions, cNTN (r; j)
and cNTT (r; j), should also depend on age t. However, as the discount rate is equal to
the interest rate, there is nothing to be gained from distorting these consumption levels
over time. In other words, for individuals who are both retired and tagged, age does not
provide any information on whether the agent was able to work when he retired. Thus,
allowing consumption to depend on age would not help the social planner relax any in-
centive compatibility constraints. We can therefore safely omit the age t from these last
two consumption functions.
Importantly, in this section, the disability standards
n
^t
o
t2[0;H]
are assumed to be
exogenously determined. This assumption will be relaxed in the last section of the paper
where they become additional control variables of the planner.
Now that we have dened the planners control variables, we can derive his objective
and constraints. Ex post, a given individual is characterized by the age i at which he
became disabled and the age j at which he became tagged. The ex-ante probability
density of becoming individual (i; j) is equal to f(i; j), as dened by (1), (2) and (3).
Let us now derive the ex-post lifetime utility v(i; j) of individual (i; j). If an agent
retires before becoming tagged, i.e. min fi; RUg < j, his utility is:
v(i; j) =
Z minfi;RUg
0
e t

u(cWU(t))  b dt (4)
+
Z j
minfi;RUg
e tu(cNU(t;min fi; RUg))dt
+
Z H
j
e tu(cNTN (min fi; RUg ; j))dt:
From age 0 to min fi; RUg the individual is working and untagged, he consumes cWU(t)
at age t and gets disutility b from working. From age min fi; RUg to j, he is retired
and untagged and gets the corresponding consumption level cNU(t;min fi; RUg) at age
t. Finally, from age j to H, his consumption level is that of a retired and tagged who
retired before becoming tagged. Now, if an agent becomes tagged before retirement or if
he becomes tagged and retires simultaneously, i.e. j  min fi; RUg, his utility is:
v(i; j) =
Z j
0
e t

u(cWU(t))  b dt (5)
+
Z minfi;RT (j)g
j
e t

u(cWT (t; j))  b dt
+
Z H
minfi;RT (j)g
e tu(cNTT (min fi; RT (j)g ; j))dt:
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From age 0 to j, the individual is working and untagged; from j to min fi; RT (j)g, he
is working and tagged; and from min fi; RT (j)g to H, he is retired and tagged. Note
that the working and tagged are induced to work until age min fi; RT (j)g and, hence,
get disutility b from working.
The objective of the social planner is to maximize the ex-ante expected lifetime utility
of workers which is equal to:
E [v(i; j)] =
Z H
0
Z H
0
v(i; j)f(i; j)didj, (6)
since each individual faces a likelihood f(i; j) of becoming individual (i; j) with lifetime
utility v(i; j).
To derive the resource constraint of the planners problem, we need to know the
lifetime budget decit z(i; j) generated by individual (i; j). For min fi; RUg < j, we
have:
z(i; j) =
Z minfi;RUg
0
e t

cWU(t)  t

dt (7)
+
Z j
minfi;RUg
e tcNU(t;min fi; RUg)dt
+
Z H
j
e tcNTN (min fi; RUg ; j)dt;
where we have used the fact that working agents, who get disutility b from work in (4),
produce t units of consumption goods at age t. Similarly, for j  min fi; RUg, we have:
z(i; j) =
Z j
0
e t

cWU(t)  t

dt (8)
+
Z minfi;RT (j)g
j
e t

cWT (t; j)  t

dt
+
Z H
minfi;RT (j)g
e tcNTT (min fi; RT (j)g ; j)dt:
Thus, the planners resource constraint is:
E [z(i; j)]  0. (9)
The resource constraint therefore imposes that the expected lifetime consumption of
individuals does not exceed the amount that they are expected to produce.
Finally, the optimal allocation of resources must satisfy a set of incentive compatibility
constraints which ensure that able individuals choose to work (provided that they have
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not yet reached the retirement age). Able individuals can either be untagged or tagged.
Hence, the set of incentive compatibility constraints could be divided into two subsets,
one for the untagged and the other for the tagged. The rst subset imposes that the
untagged who are able and younger than RU choose to work. More formally, let vt(i; j)
denote the ex-post lifetime utility of individual (i; j) from age t onwards.15 For each age
t 2 [0; RU), we must impose the following incentive compatibility constraint:
E [vt(i; j)ji > t; j > t]  E [vt(t; j)ji > t; j > t] . (10)
It requires that, at age t, the expected utility from working until the retirement age
chosen by the planner or until disability occurs, E [vt(i; j)ji > t; j > t], is never smaller
than the expected utility from retiring at t, E [vt(t; j)ji > t; j > t].
The second subset imposes that agents tagged at age j who are able and younger than
RT (j) choose to work. Thus, for each tag age j 2 [0; RU) and each age t 2 [j; RT (j)),
the following incentive compatibility constraint must hold:
E [vt(i; j)ji > t]  E [vt(t; j)ji > t] . (11)
This requires that, at age t, the expected utility from working until RT (j) or until
disability occurs, E [vt(i; j)ji > t], is never smaller than the expected utility from retiring
at t, E [vt(t; j)ji > t]. Note that, in (11), j is not a random variable since its value is
already known at age t (as j  t).16 Interestingly, this last subset of constraints is
formally identical to the one imposed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). This is due
to the fact that, once an agent is tagged, the planner cannot rely on any additional
information about his health and therefore acts as if health was completely unobservable.
The di¤erence between cNT (r; j) depending on whether the individual retires rst, i.e.
cNTN (r; j) if r < j , or becomes tagged at retirement or before, i.e. c
NT
T (r; j) if j  r, is
explained by the fact that the latter consumption levels enter the incentive compatibility
constraints of the tagged while the former do not.
The planners problem is:
maxE [v(i; j)] (12)
subject to:
 Resource constraint:
E [z(i; j)]  0;
15Thus, v0(i; j) is equal to v(i; j) as dened by (4) and (5).
16Also, note that E [vt(t; j)ji > t] = vt(t; j) since, once an agent is retired and tagged, the occurrence
of disability can no longer a¤ect his welfare.
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 Incentive compatibility constraints for the untagged:
8t 2 [0; RU); E [vt(i; j)ji > t; j > t]  E [vt(t; j)ji > t; j > t] ;
 Incentive compatibility constraints for the tagged:
8j 2 [0; RU);8t 2 [j; RT (j)); E [vt(i; j)ji > t]  E [vt(t; j)ji > t] .
The control variables are cWU(), cWT (), cNU(), cNTN (), cNTT (), RT () and RU . The fully
detailed planners problem is given in Appendix A.
It should be emphasized that the generality of the planners problem implies that,
once the optimal allocation has been derived, there is no additional screening mechanism
which could further improve welfare. In Parsons (1996) and Kleven and Kopczuk (2011),
individuals applying for the tag cannot know in advance whether they are going to be
successful or not. However, the disabled have a higher probability of being awarded the
tag than the able. Thus, a high cost of applying for disability benets, through fees
or complexity, can be used as a screening device to reduce, or even eliminate, leakages.
However, this possibility does not arise in our framework where agents can know the
outcome of the test, through their private doctor for instance, before applying.
2.3 First-order conditions
The optimal allocation of resources is the solution to a constrained optimization problem.
If we consider that the control variables are the utility levels of the agents, rather than
their consumption levels, then the objective and the incentive compatibility constraints
are linear while the resource constraint is convex. Hence, the corresponding rst-order
conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient.
The remaining control variables of the planner are the retirement ages. In that respect,
a key feature of our model is that labor supply is indivisible which, at any given point
in time, creates a non-convexity into workerslabor supply problem. As emphasized by
Mulligan (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), this non-convexity is easily overcome
in a life-cycle framework. Indeed, agents convexify their labor supply problem by working
for a fraction of their lives and enjoying leisure for the remaining fraction. Hence, here, as
in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), we have a "time averaging" model of the labor supply.17
In that context, the planners optimal retirement ages are characterized by rst-order
conditions.
17Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) established some equivalence results between lotteries and time av-
eraging models of indivisible labor.
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Finally, we conjecture that all the incentive compatibility constraints are binding. If
they were not, then welfare could be improved by lowering the consumption levels of the
able while increasing those of the disabled.18 Our numerical simulation conrms that all
the Lagrange multipliers are positive.
Importantly, the incentive compatibility constraints imply that, for agents who have
not yet reached the planners retirement ages, able individuals are all working and non-
working individuals are all disabled.
We now review the rst-order conditions that characterize the planners optimal al-
location of resources. The consumption levels at t of the able and disabled who became
tagged at age j are related by:
d
dt
1
u0(cWT (t; j))
=

1
u0(cWT (t; j))
  1
u0(cNTT (t; j))

f(t)
1  F (t) : (13)
This condition is identical to the original inverse Euler equation derived in Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978). Indeed, once the tag has been awarded, the planner does not have any
further information on the health of the people, which implies that we are back to the
unobservable health benchmark.
What is the general intuition for these inverse Euler equations? Recall that the
incentive compatibility constraints are linear in utilities. Hence, to preserve incentives to
work, resources shifted to the next point in time must increase the utility in the good
state, i.e. able and working, as much as in the bad state, i.e. disabled and non-working.
Note that, as a result, more resources need to be allocated to the good state, where
marginal utility is low, than to the bad state, where it is high. However, such transfers
of utilities across time should be done at minimum budgetary cost. It follows that,
at the optimum, the planner equates the marginal resource cost of providing utility at
di¤erent points in time. Indeed, the inverse marginal utility of consumption is precisely
the marginal resource cost of providing utility, i.e. 1=u0(c) = 1=(du=dc) = dc(u)=du where
c()  u 1().19
Finally, note that f(t)=(1   F (t)) is the probability density that a tagged agent be-
comes disabled at t given that he was able up to then. The rst-order condition (13)
imposes that the lower is this probability of becoming disabled, the lower is the consump-
18Golosov and Tsyvinski (2004) provide a formal proof in a simpler context with unobservable health.
19Let uWT (t; j)  u(cWT (t; j)), uNTT (t; j)  u(cNTT (t; j)) and c()  u 1(), which implies that
c0(uWT (t; j)) = 1=u0(cWT (t; j)) and c0(uNTT (t; j)) = 1=u
0(cNTT (t; j)). Relying on these notations, the
above interpretation is easier to follow if the rst-order condition (13) is written as:
c0(uWT (t  dt; j)) =

1  f(t)dt
1  F (t)

c0(uWT (t; j)) +
f(t)dt
1  F (t)c
0(uNTT (t; j)),
which shows that the marginal resource cost of providing utility today, at t   dt, must be equal to the
expected marginal resource cost of providing utility tomorrow, at t.
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tion level of non-working agents cNTT (t; j) for a given path of c
WT (t; j). This enhances
incentives to work at little cost in terms of insurance.
The boundary condition associated with (13) is:
lim
t!RT (j) 
cWT (t; j) = cNTT (RT (j); j): (14)
As workers approach the retirement age, incentives to participate only need to be provided
for a short period of time. Hence, consumption can be almost perfectly smoothed over
time.
The optimal retirement age RT (j) of an able worker who became tagged at age j
solves:
b
u0(cWT (RT (j); j))
= RT (j): (15)
The agent keeps working until his marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption equals his marginal product of labor. Indeed, the marginal utility cost of
working one more unit of time is b while the marginal product from doing so is RT (j) at
age RT (j).
The consumption levels of working and non-working agents of age i, who are not
tagged, are related by:
d
di
1
u0(cWU(i))
=

1
u0(cWU(i))
  1
u0(cNU(t; i))

(16)

h
1 GD(^t)
i
f(i)h
1 GD(^t)
i
[F (t)  F (i)] +
h
1 GA(^t)
i
[1  F (t)]
;
for any t  i. The interpretation is similar to that of equation (13), except that the
coe¢ cient on the right stands for the probability density with which an agent became
disabled at age i given that he was previously able and that he is still not tagged at age
t. The lower is this probability, i.e. the more unlikely it is that an agent truly became
disabled at i given that he is still untagged at t, the lower should cNU(t; i) be. Indeed, if
the absence of a tag at age t reveals that an agent probably lied about becoming disabled
at i, then this agent should be punished with a low consumption level cNU(t; i). This
improves incentives at little cost in terms of insurance. This key insight shows how the
imperfect tag can be used in a dynamic setup to extract information on the true health
status of an individual. The boundary condition associated with (16) is:
lim
t!RU 
cWU(t) = cNU(t; RU);8t 2 [RU;H]: (17)
Again, as workers approach the retirement age, their consumption converges to the level
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that they will obtain when they retire.
Similarly, the consumption levels of the non-working and tagged, who stopped working
before becoming tagged, and of the working and untagged are linked by:
d
di
1
u0(cWU(i))
=

1
u0(cWU(i))
  1
u0(cNTN (i; j))

(18)
 gD(^j)
d^j
dj
f(i)
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
[1  F (j)] +
h
GD(^j) GA(^j)
i
f(j) + gD(^j)
d^j
dj
[F (j)  F (i)]
;
where we must have j > i. The coe¢ cient on the right stands for the probability density
with which an agent became disabled at i given that he was previously able and that
he became tagged at j. Again, the lower is this probability, i.e. the more unlikely it is
that an agent truly became disabled at i given that he got tagged at j, the lower should
cNTN (i; j) be. The corresponding boundary condition is:
lim
t!RU 
cWU(t) = cNTN (RU; j);8j 2 (RU;H]: (19)
Together with (17), this implies that being awarded the tag after retirement does not
make any di¤erence to those who worked until the maximum retirement age RU .
The consumption levels of the newly tagged, working and non-working, are related to
that of the working and untagged by the following condition:
1
u0(cWU(j))
=
1
u0(cWT (j; j))
 

1
u0(cWT (j; j))
  1
u0(cNTT (j; j))

(20)

h
GD(^j) GA(^j)
i
f(j)
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
[1  F (j)] +
h
GD(^j) GA(^j)
i
f(j)
;
where the coe¢ cient on the right corresponds to the probability density with which an
agent becomes disabled at age j given that he was previously able and that he becomes
tagged at j. This rst-order condition imposes that, at the optimum, the resource cost
of a marginal increase in utility in the two states observed by the planner, i.e. tagged
and untagged, should be equalized. Interestingly, although not dynamic, this condition,
which was originally derived by Parsons (1996) in a static context, relates inverse marginal
utilities.20
All these rst-order conditions relating inverse marginal utilities show that the planner
wants to equalize the marginal resource cost of providing utility to the agents across time
20In a discrete time version of our model, this rst-order condition (20) becomes exactly identical to
the one derived by Parsons (1996). Note that a discrete time model cannot be analytically tractable
with an extensive labor supply margin.
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and across states. This general principle nests the standard inverse Euler equation derived
by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), condition (13), the rst-order condition of Parsons
(1996), condition (20), as well as the two rst-order conditions which are specic to this
paper, (16) and (18).
Finally, the rst-order condition pinning down the optimal retirement age of the
untagged is:
b
u0(cWU(RU))
= RU : (21)
Again, as for condition (15), the interpretation is that, at the retirement age, the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption should be equal to the marginal
product of labor.
The Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint is equal to u0(cWU(0)).
The Lagrange multipliers of the incentive compatibility constraints of the newly tagged,
given by (11) with t = j, are:
u0(cWU(0))

1
u0(cWT (j; j))
  1
u0(cWU(j))

; (22)
with j 2 [0; RU), and those of the previously tagged, given by (11) with t > j, are:
u0(cWU(0))
d
dt
1
u0(cWT (t; j))
; (23)
with j 2 [0; RU) and t 2 (j; RT (j)). Binding constraints imply that these multipliers are
positive and, hence, that the consumption of tagged workers should initially be higher
than that of the untagged and it should then be increasing over the life-cycle (until age
RT (j)). It is indeed common in dynamic contract theory that back-loaded incentives are
optimal as they maintain incentives to work over time. Similarly, the Lagrange multipliers
of the incentive compatibility constraints of the untagged, given by (10), are:
u0(cWU(0))
d
dt
1
u0(cWU(t))
; (24)
with t 2 [0; RU), which implies that the consumption of the working and untagged should
also be increasing over the life-cycle (until age RU).
We now have a full set of conditions determining the optimal allocation.
Proposition 1 An optimal Social Security system with imperfect tagging should imple-
ment the allocation of resources which is characterized by the rst-order conditions (13),
(14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21) together with the resource constraint, (9),
the incentive compatibility constraints for the untagged, (10), and for the tagged, (11).21
21The full expressions for these three set of constraints to the planners problem are given in Appendix
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To gain additional insights about this optimal incentive-feasible allocation we need to
perform a numerical simulation. But, before that, the model needs to be calibrated.
3 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the distributions and parameters of the model.
The discussion is divided into four parts: agents skill prole, their preferences, the
distribution of the disability age and, nally, the trade-o¤ between gaps and leakages.
3.1 Skill prole
All individuals are assumed to enter the labor market at the age of 25 and die on their 80th
birthday. As in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), productivity t at each age t is determined
by tting a quadratic approximation to the data in Rios-Rull (1996). The resulting skill
prole is characterized by a productivity of 1 at age 25 and 75, i.e. 25 = 75 = 1, and
by a peak of 1.47 at age 50, i.e. 50 = 1:47.
3.2 Preferences
Agents are assumed to exhibit constant relative risk aversion so that:
u(c) =
c1    1
1   . (25)
We set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  equal to 2. The annual discount rate
, which also equals the annual interest rate, is set at 0:02. The xed cost b of working
is calibrated such that, in the unobservable health case, the able retire at age 65. This
exercise yields b = 1:092.22
3.3 Distribution of the disability age
To determine the likelihood of being disabled at age t, F (t), we rely on cross-sectional
data from the 2003 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that surveys a
representative sample of the U.S. population.23 We make use of the following question:
A by (A2), (A3) and (A4), respectively.
22Note that choosing b such that, in the unobservable health benchmark, the retirement age is equal
to 65 is equivalent to choosing b such that, in the planners optimal allocation, the able and untagged
retire at age 67.3 (cf. Table 2 below).
23This is the same data source as used by Low and Pistaferri (2012). Other authors such as Benitez-
Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2006) chose to work with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) instead.
However, this is not an alternative for us as it only covers individuals over the age of 50.
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"Do you have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work
or the amount of work you can do?"
Specied answers are "yes" and "no"; accordingly we dene any respondent who answers
"yes" as disabled. At each age, the probability of being disabled is then set equal to the
fraction of people answering "yes", using cross-sectional weights to correct for over- or
under-representation of certain groups. The result is depicted in Figure 2. To obtain a
smooth estimation of the disability distribution, we t an exponential function through
the resulting time series with the data points weighted by the number of observations for
each age.
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Figure 2: Distribution of disability age
At face value, our denition of disability may seem rather mild. However, in the
context of our model, disability should not be interpreted too narrowly. Indeed, any
individual whose productivity is virtually equal to zero can be considered to be disabled.
With, for instance, less than 40% of all 75-year-olds unable to work, it yields, if anything,
numbers which are below what one might plausibly expect. Moreover, these gures are
in line with those used in related papers (see, e.g., Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006).
An obvious concern with self-reported disability is that some workers, such as those
applying for disability insurance, might exaggerate the severity of their health prob-
lems. However, Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser and Rust (2004) show that
self-reported disability is in fact an unbiased predictor of the true disability status of
individuals as measured by the U.S. Social Security Administration.
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3.4 Trade-o¤ between gaps and leakages
The outcome of the health test for both disabled, gD(), and able, gA(), individuals
is assumed to be normally distributed. The two distributions are characterized by a
di¤erence in means equal to  and a standard deviation of 1.24 Although the actual
means of the two distributions are inconsequential (cf. footnote 10), for clarity, we adopt
the normalization that they sum up to 0. Thus, the means of gA() and gD() are =2
and  =2, respectively.
To obtain an estimate of , information is required on individualsability to work,
i.e. able or disabled, as well as their o¢ cial disability classication, tagged or untagged.
For this, the disability data from above are combined with information on the sources of
individualsrevenue (which for 2003 are provided in the 2005 wave of the PSID). Everyone
above the age of 65 is excluded from our sample, as these people have reached the full
retirement age and are shifted to the retired worker portion of the U.S. Social Security
system.25,26
An individuals disability classication, i.e. tagged or untagged, is a random variable
following a Bernoulli distribution, where the probability of being tagged depends on his
age t 2 f25; :::; 65g and on his ability to work. An agent of age t is awarded the tag when
his test outcome falls below ^t. The structure of our model therefore implies that:
Pr(TaggedjAge = t;Ability) = 
 
65X
s=25
^sI(s = t)  
2
I(Able) + 
2
I(Disabled)
!
, (26)
where () is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and I() is the indicator
function which is equal to 1 if the condition in brackets is satised and to 0 otherwise.27
Rearranging terms, a simple probit regression of disability classication on a set of age
dummies and on self-reported ability status can be employed to obtain an estimate of
24Alternatively, we could x  and calibrate the standard deviation. However, xing the standard
deviation is particularly suitable in our context as with  = 0 the problem collapses to the unobservable
health case treated by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).
25Within the sample of people aged 25-65, a small proportion of individuals receives other types of
Social Security benets, such as retirement, survivors or dependent benets. We exclude them on the
grounds that the U.S. Social Security program may place disabled individuals with certain employment
histories or family structures in a Social Security category other than disability benets. Hence, we
cannot know whether, absent these other benets, they would get disability benets.
26In our PSID data set and across all age groups (from age 25 to 65), out of 9 327 individuals, 84.2%
report to be able and untagged, 9.7% to be disabled and untagged, 2.4% to be able and tagged and 3.6%
to be disabled and tagged.
27For instance, it follows from the normality of gA() that:
Pr(TaggedjAge = 45;Able) = 
 
^45   =2
1
!
.
The expression (26) is just a generalization that encompasses all possible ages and ability statuses.
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 and of
n
^t
o
t2[25;65]
. Doing so, we obtain  = 1:2329. As shown in Figure 3, the
estimated path of ^t is increasing with age. This is consistent with our assumption of
a non-decreasing disability standard. The McFaddens pseudo R2 for this regression is
19.9%.
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Figure 3: Disability standard
Note that both our theoretical model and empirical strategy rely on the assumption
that the di¤erence in means, , is the same at every age. To establish the validity of
this claim, we run a probit regression where  is allowed to be age-specic. It can be
seen from Figure 4 that the resulting estimates do not exhibit any systematic pattern
with respect to age. Indeed, when we test the hypothesis that  is constant, we obtain a
p-value of 0.813.
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Figure 4: Di¤erence in means
4 Numerical results
In order to provide some quantitative insights about the optimal Social Security system
with imperfect tagging, this section presents a numerical simulation of the optimal allo-
cation and an evaluation of the corresponding welfare gains. But, before turning to the
results, we need to describe how the disability standard for each age t, ^t, is set.
4.1 Minimizing gaps and leakages
We consider the benchmark case where the path of the disability standard is set so as to
minimize the total number of gaps and leakages, but allowing for a preference between
the two. This preference is captured by dening a price of gaps, pG, and of leakages, pL.
For instance, a higher price of gaps, i.e. pG > pL, implies that gaps should be avoided
more than leakages.
More formally, the disability standard is set by solving:
min
f^tgt2[0;H]
Z H
0
n
pGF (t)
h
1 GD(^t)
i
+ pL [1  F (t)]GA(^t)
o
dt, (27)
where F (t)
h
1 GD(^t)
i
and [1  F (t)]GA(^t) correspond to the total number of gaps
and of leakages at age t, respectively. In fact, this reduces to a static optimization problem
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for any given age, which yields the following rst-order condition:
pGF (t)gD(^t) = pL [1  F (t)] gA(^t): (28)
The marginal benet from increasing ^t is less gaps, the marginal cost more leakages. At
the optimum, these two e¤ects, weighted by their respective prices, have to be equal to
each other. Making use of the normality of the distribution of the test outcome, gA()
and gD(), we have:
^t =
1

ln

F (t)
1  F (t)

+
1

ln

pG
pL

: (29)
Recall that the probit regression (26) from the last section yields the estimates for
the disability standards displayed in Figure 3. To see whether they are consistent with
the minimization of gaps and leakages, we add an age-specic error term to (29) and
run an OLS regression of ^t on a constant and on the tted values28 of ln
h
F (t)
1 F (t)
i
. We
then test the hypothesis that the slope coe¢ cient is equal to our previous estimate of
1= = 1=1:2329 = 0:8111 and obtain a p-value of 0.028. In fact, the point estimate of the
slope coe¢ cient is 0.6907 which suggests that, to minimize the number of classication
errors, the disability standard should increase slightly more rapidly with age than it
currently does. However, if we run a constrained regression, which imposes that the
slope coe¢ cient must be equal to 1= = 1=1:2329 = 0:8111, we obtain the smooth line in
Figure 3. As it provides a good t to the empirically estimated ^t, we shall consider that
the minimization of gaps and leakages is a good approximation to the current policy of
the U.S. Social Security system.
Finally, the constant coe¢ cient of the constrained regression implies a relative price
of gaps and leakages equal to 1.1998. Hence, in our subsequent evaluation of the welfare
gains, we shall consider that the current disability standard in the U.S. is given by (29)
with a relative price of gaps and leakages of 1.2.29
The numerical simulation of the next subsection assumes that the planner controls
the relative price pG=pL and sets it to maximize welfare. A simple grid search reveals
that the optimal price ratio is approximately equal to 2.5. Thus, if the optimal allocation
is implemented, then it is desirable to decrease the strictness of the disability test.
The minimization of gaps and leakages corresponds to a natural benchmark where the
government makes a non-strategic use of its imperfect information on health. Further-
more, several arguments may be advanced in support of such a policy being constrained
28We use the smoothed representation of F (t) as displayed in Figure 2 since the decision to award the
tag should be based on the disability distribution prevailing in the entire population.
29This measure of the strictness of the disability test is based on our PSID data set and, hence,
implicitly, on the fraction of tagged individuals in the population. Since take-up is not systematic, this
measure is not readily comparable to other estimates of the disability standard found in the literature
which are exclusively based on the applicants to disability insurance.
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optimal. For one, the government might not be able to directly control doctors because
their professional ethics may dictate them that they should make as few classication
errors as possible. If so, the role of the government will be reduced to specifying the
relative importance of gaps and leakages. Alternatively, one may think that the only tag-
ging policy that is politically acceptable is one that minimizes gaps and leakages. Indeed,
Weinzierl (2012) argues that most people are attached to the equal sacrice principle
which requires that tags should be as strongly correlated with the underlying income-
earning ability as possible.
4.2 Numerical simulation
All numerical simulations are achieved by solving a discretized version of the system of
equations which characterizes the optimal allocation. The disability standard used for
the reported simulation is determined from (29) with pG=pL = 2:5.
The consumption of the working and untagged, cWU(t), is plotted in Figure 5. Increas-
ing consumption with age renders incentives back-loaded. This has the dual advantage
of not only inducing the old and able to work, but also the young and able since by work-
ing they maintain the prospect of high consumption when old. As previously discussed,
this consumption pattern is imposed by the incentive compatibility constraint for the
untagged.
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Figure 5: Consumption of the working and untagged
The maximum retirement age of the economy, that of the able and untagged, RU ,
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is 67.3 years. This is relatively high compared to the corresponding age of 65 prevailing
with unobservable health. In fact, with partially observable health, insurance against
disability can, to a great extent, be provided by raising the consumption of the non-
working tagged, which does not reduce incentives to work for the able and untagged.
Hence, the consumption level needed to induce the able and untagged to work is not so
high. As a result, their marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is
relatively low and it is optimal to let them retire rather late.
Figure 6 depicts cNU(t; r), the consumption of a non-working untagged individual
as a function of his current age t and of the age r at which he ceased to work, with
t  r. Recall that an untagged agent only retires before RU if he becomes disabled, i.e.
r = min fi; RUg. For a given retirement age r, the consumption of the agent is falling
with age t and is minimal at 80 years old. To understand this pattern, which follows from
the rst-order condition (16), note that the planner wants to give high consumption to
the truly disabled while deterring the able from claiming to be unable to work. To nd
the best compromise between these two goals, the planner exploits the fact that a truly
disabled is unlikely to remain untagged for long. Thus, consumption is initially high to
provide insurance. It then decreases over time as this lower consumption level is unlikely
to a¤ect the truly disabled but would be likely to apply to an able person who claimed to
be disabled. The very low consumption levels at 80 years old, at the end of the life-cycle,
serve as a threat and are therefore not welfare-reducing.
Figure 6: Consumption of the non-working and untagged
Figure 7 gives the consumption of a working and tagged individual, cWT (t; j), as a
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function of his current age t and of the age j at which he became tagged, with t  j.
For any given tag age j, consumption is increasing with age t. Again, the need to main-
tain incentives to work now and in the future makes back-loaded incentives particularly
attractive.
Figure 7: Consumption of the working and tagged
Figure 8 shows the retirement age of the able and tagged, RT (j), as a function of
the age j at which the tag was awarded. The informative nature of the tag implies
that the proportion of disabled will always be higher among the tagged than among the
untagged. Higher consumption should therefore be provided to the non-working and
tagged which means that an even higher consumption level is needed to induce the able
and tagged to work. But this increases their marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption. It is therefore not surprising that the optimal retirement age of all the
tagged is lower than that of the untagged.
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To understand why the retirement age is a U-shaped function of the tag age, recall
from the rst-order condition (20) that the expected marginal resource cost of providing
utility should be the same whether the agent is newly tagged or untagged. But, initially,
the tagged are very likely to be able to work, which implies that cWU(j) and cWT (j; j)
are almost equal to each other. As j rises, cWU(j) increases which raises cWT (j; j). This
makes back-loaded incentives so costly that it is optimal to reduce the retirement age. For
higher tag ages, the tagged are more likely to be truly disabled and, hence, in equation
(20), the increase in cNTT (j; j) also contributes to match the increase in c
WU(j). Thus,
the increase in cWT (j; j) can be kept smaller, making back-loaded incentives cheaper and
allowing the retirement age to be raised. This intuition concurs with the concave shape
of cWT (j; j), which is apparent along the diagonal in Figure 7. Note that a reasonable
approximation of the optimal policy might be to implement an early retirement age of
62 for all those who got tagged before 57.
Figure 9 shows cNT (r; j), the consumption of the non-working and tagged who ceased
to work at r and became tagged at j. Two sections are clearly distinguishable: cNTT (r; j),
r  j, on the left and cNTN (r; j), j > r, on the right. This discontinuity is due to the incen-
tive compatibility constraint for the tagged which only applies on the left. It should be
emphasized that, while previous graphs were displaying instantaneous consumption lev-
els, this one reports permanent consumption levels. Indeed, individuals consume cNT (r; j)
from max fr; jg until they die at age 80.
29
Figure 9: Consumption of the non-working and tagged
As argued above, it is desirable to provide back-loaded incentives to the working and
tagged. But having an increasing consumption level for working individuals is not the
only way to do so. In addition, the consumption of the non-working could be made
higher, the later they ceased to work. This explains why, for a xed tag age j, cNTT (r; j)
is increasing in r.
For an individual who stopped working before becoming tagged, his consumption
once tagged is lower the later he became tagged, i.e. cNTN (r; j) is decreasing in j. This
follows from (18). The intuition for this is similar to that for cNU(t; r). If someone is
truly disabled, he is likely to be awarded the tag shortly after stopping to work. In this
case, the insurance motive commands a high consumption level. A low consumption level
for the non-working who only get tagged much later serves as a threat to the able and
untagged who might be tempted to claim to be disabled.
Turning to the diagonal of Figure 9, it is apparent that a higher consumption level is
awarded if retirement occurs before the award of the tag. To understand this, note that a
newly tagged worker who stops working gets consumption cNTT () immediately, while an
untagged worker who stops working initially obtains cNU() and is only likely to rapidly
qualify for cNTN () if he is truly disabled. Thus, high values of cNTN () are not detrimental
to the provision of incentives to work, while high values of cNTT () are.
It can be checked that the only situation where agents are not happy to be tagged
as soon as they become eligible is when disability and eligibility occur simultaneously.
The solution to this problem is to impose a compulsory health check to individuals who
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have just stopped working. For this solution to work, the outcome  of the test for
a given individual should be exogenous to his action. A (computationally intensive)
alternative would be to impose additional constraints to the planners problem ensuring
that individuals are always happy to be awarded the tag as soon as they are eligible. This
would eliminate the discontinuity of cNT (). However, within our framework, imposing
such extra constraints is not necessary and would come at the cost of reduced welfare.
The U.S. disability insurance program imposes a ve-month waiting period out of
the labor force before an individual can apply for the award of a tag. While we do not
investigate the implementation of the optimal allocation in a decentralized economy, the
above results show that the consumption levels of individuals who stop working should
initially be as smooth as possible. This suggests that, in a decentralized economy, the
waiting period can only be justied if agents have enough savings to sustain a decent
consumption level before the award of disability benets.
While it might not be justied to have a mandatory waiting period for all, the gov-
ernment should nevertheless make use of the information revealed by the existence of a
waiting period for some workers. Indeed, Figure 9 shows that the provision of insurance
should be more generous to those who stop working a few months before being awarded
the tag.
4.3 Welfare gains
Our numerical simulations allow us to evaluate the welfare implications of the implemen-
tation of the optimal allocation. To get an idea about the gains generated by imperfect
tagging, we take the unobservable health case, analyzed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), as the reference. We also consider the rst-best allo-
cation which gives an upper bound to the welfare gains that could be obtained.
A key characteristic of the Social Security system that we propose is that it implements
a health-dependent retirement age.30 In order to assess the importance of this feature, we
also compute the welfare obtained when the retirement age of the able has to be the same
for all. More formally, the planners problem remains the same except that we impose
RU = RT (j)  R, 8j 2 [0; RU). The optimal retirement age is then pinned down by
the following condition,
b
241 GA(^R)
u0(cWU(R))
+
Z R
0
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
u0(cWT (R; j))
dj
35 = R, (30)
which replaces (15) and (21). A weighted average of the marginal rates of substitution
30Again, it should be stressed that the retirement age is dependent on health as observed by the
government but that it only applies to the able, who are, by denition, in good health.
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between leisure and consumption should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation
at retirement.
A policy yields consumption-equivalent welfare gains of x% if its level of welfare can
be matched in the unobservable health case by proportionally increasing consumption by
x% in every state of the world. The results are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Welfare gains compared to unobservable health
Fixed Health-dependent First-best
retirement age retirement age
pG=pL = 2:5 0:45% 0:64% 2:98%
pG=pL = 1:2 0:41% 0:56% 2:98%
In the rst line the planner sets the optimal price of gaps and leakages.31 If, however,
doctors are out of control and the government has to stick with the current disability
standards, then the relevant results are those of the second line. The welfare gains
generated by the imperfect information on health, equal to 0.64% when pG=pL = 2:5, are
moderate but non-negligible. More than two thirds of these gains could be reaped with
a xed retirement age for all.
Clearly, from equation (29), as most people are able to work, the disability standards
are quite low when almost equal weights are put on gaps and leakages, i.e. when pG=pL =
1:2. This implies that few people are tagged and, hence, only a limited use of the imperfect
information on health could be made. This explains why the corresponding welfare gains
are larger with pG=pL = 2:5.
The welfare improvements generated by the optimal policy can come from two sources:
improved insurance against the disability risk or improved incentives to work. The sta-
tistics on the average retirement age in Table 2, for the case pG=pL = 2:5, suggest that
at least some of the gains come from better incentives to work.
Table 2: Retirement ages
Unobservable Fixed Health-dependent First-best
health retirement age retirement age
Average retirement age 61:5 61:9 62:2 64:1
Maximum retirement age 65 65:4 67:3 68:4
31Note that the optimal relative price with a xed retirement age is also approximately equal to 2.5.
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The average retirement age is the average age at which people cease to work, conditional
on being able at 25. In all four scenarios, almost a quarter of the population retires at the
onset of disability. In the health-dependent retirement age case, about two thirds of the
remaining three quarters of the population reach the maximum retirement age RU , which
is smaller than the rst-best retirement age as relatively high consumption is needed to
induce the able and untagged to work until RU .
We have so far focused on the, rather theoretical, unobservable health benchmark.
While the current U.S. Social Security system already uses imperfect information on
health, one of the key di¤erences between our optimal policy and that observed in the
U.S. is that the able and tagged are currently not incentivized to work.32 To evaluate
the welfare gains generated by this feature of the optimal policy, we solved a modied
planners problem where the constraint RT (j) = j, for all j 2 [0; RU), is imposed.
Compared to the unobservable health case, the optimal policy under the constraint
that all the tagged retire immediately, yields a welfare gain of 0.46% when pG=pL = 1:2.33
It follows that switching from an optimal policy where the able and tagged do not work,
i.e. RT (j) = j, to our optimal policy where they are incentivized to work up to a health-
dependent retirement age generates welfare gains of only 0:56%  0:46% = 0:10%. These
welfare gains are even negative, and equal to 0:41%  0:46% =  0:05%, with a common
retirement age for all. In this latter case, the costs of inducing work until the general
retirement age are so large that they more than absorb all the benets from encouraging
work in the rst place. This shows that inducing the able and tagged to work is only
desirable up to a point, i.e. up to an early retirement age; which somewhat qualies the
main message of Parsons (1996).
If the optimal relative price of gaps and leakages of 2.5 can be enforced, then our
optimal policy generates a welfare gain of 0:64%   0:46% = 0:18% compared to the
optimal policy under the constraints RT (j) = j and pG=pL = 1:2. It is therefore desirable
to decrease the strictness of the disability test but, crucially, the able and tagged should
be induced to work. Indeed, with pG=pL = 2:5, the policy of immediate retirement of the
tagged generates a welfare loss of 0.45% compared to the unobservable health case. This
illustrates the possibility that no information on health could be preferable to some badly
used information. The problem with pG=pL = 2:5 when RT (j) = j is that about 30% of
the population retires when awarded the tag. To compensate for the sharp reduction in
labor supply that this entails, the general retirement age RU needs to be pushed up to
32The UK has recently experimented with a policy, Pathways to Work, encouraging employment
among disability recipients. Preliminary evaluations suggest very high returns on investment both to
the beneciaries and to the taxpayer (Adam, Bozio, Emmerson, Greenberg and Knight, 2008). However,
a similar policy in the U.S., Ticket to Work, failed to increase participation (Autor and Duggan, 2006,
2007).
33The optimal relative price with immediate retirement of all tagged is pG=pL = 0:9. The corresponding
welfare gain, compared to unobservable health, is 0.47%.
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72.1, which results in an average retirement age of only 61.0.
The continuous rise in the disability rolls over the past three decades has induced
many policy makers to suggest a rise in the strictness of the disability standards. We nd
the opposite result that welfare would be increased by decreasing the strictness of the
disability tests. However, crucially, this is only true provided that the able and tagged
are induced to work up to some early retirement age.34
In addition to the 0.18% that could be gained by inducing the able and tagged to work,
another major welfare-enhancing change recommended by our optimal policy consists in
making strategic use of the di¤erence between the age of occurrence of disability and
the age of award of the tag. However, lacking a good benchmark representation of the
current U.S. situation, it is not possible to isolate the corresponding welfare gains.
5 First-best implementation
We have so far considered the optimal Social Security system when the government
chooses a path of ^t that minimizes the total number of classication errors but allowing
for di¤erent prices for gaps and leakages. Although this is a rather natural choice for the
disability standard, we might be interested in determining the optimal allocation when
the whole path of ^t is directly under the control of the planner. In fact, it turns out
to be possible to asymptotically implement the rst-best, perfect information, allocation
by setting the disability standards
n
^t
o
t2[0;H]
strategically. Remember that in a rst-
best allocation perfect insurance is provided and, hence, all agents enjoy a constant
consumption stream, cFB, while the able keep supplying labor until they reach the rst-
best retirement age, RFB.
To prove that such an allocation can be asymptotically implemented, we propose a
policy that does the job.35 The planner should optimally award the tag as follows:
^t =
8><>:
 1 if t 2 [0; RFB)
^ if t = RFB
+1 if t 2 (RFB; H]
; (31)
where ^ is a constant to be determined. Hence, the only uncertainty is whether people get
tagged at the general retirement age, RFB, or immediately after. Using this simple device,
it is possible to deter deviations by setting consumption appropriately. In particular, we
34Low and Pistaferri (2012) have also reached the conclusion that the strictness of the disability
standards should be decreased. In their structural model of the labor market and of the U.S. disability
insurance program, they nd that the welfare gains generated by a better provision of insurance against
disability more than o¤set the corresponding reduced incentives to work.
35Note that the precise characterization of such a policy, and in particular of the optimal path of ^t,
is not unique.
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set:
cWU(t) = c; 8t 2 [0; RFB); (32)
cNU(t; r) = c; 8r 2 [0; RFB);8t 2 [r; RFB] (33)
cNT (r; j) =
(
 if r 2 [0; RFB) and j > RFB
c otherwise
(34)
for some constants c and . The consumption of the working and tagged is irrelevant
and does not need to be specied as people can only get tagged after retirement. Note
that the consumption level  only applies to those who retired before RFB, who therefore
claimed, rightly or wrongly, to be disabled, and who failed to be awarded the tag at RFB.
But, thanks to the monotone likelihood ratio property satised by gA() and gD(), for a
su¢ ciently high standard ^, it is almost exclusively able people who fail to get tagged at
RFB. Thus, if they claimed to be disabled before RFB, it is possible to punish a random
subset of them by setting a su¢ ciently low value of .
Proposition 2 A policy characterized by (31), (32), (33) and (34) can be used to im-
plement, asymptotically, the rst-best allocation of resources. For that, choose , as a
function of c, to be the highest value such that all the incentive compatibility constraints
of the untagged are satised. The consumption level c should then be determined from the
resource constraint. The rst-best allocation obtains as ^ ! +1, which implies  ! 0,
c ! cFB and the ex-ante expected lifetime utility of workers converges to the rst-best
level.
This proposition is formally proved in Appendix B. In a nutshell, the optimal policy is
to shoot the liars. In particular, it should be emphasized that the low value of  is not
welfare-reducing as it is essentially o¤ the equilibrium path. Note that every eligible
person is trivially happy to be awarded the tag.
The reason why the rst-best allocation can only be implemented asymptotically
is that gA() and gD() have the same support. Thus, no matter how high ^ is, the
government can never be entirely sure that someone untagged at age RFB is able to
work. If, on the contrary, the upper limit of the support of gD(), say D, is lower than
that of gA(), then the rst-best policy can be exactly implemented by setting ^ = D,
 = 0 and c = cFB. In other words, if there exists a disability test which only able people
could fail, then the optimal policy is to shoot those who claimed to be disabled before
RFB and who fail the test at age RFB.
An interesting feature is that the rst-best allocation can always be asymptotically
implemented, independently of the quality of the information on health. In terms of
our previous calibration, where gA() and gD() are both assumed to be normal, all
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that is required is that the di¤erence in means be strictly positive, i.e.  > 0. More
generally, this shows that a small departure from the assumption of unobservable skills,
which is pervasive in the New Dynamic Public Finance literature, can have considerable
consequences for the determination of the optimal policy.
Proposition 2 is reminiscent of a similar result derived by Mirrlees (1974, 1999) in the
context of moral hazard.36 While the formal, mathematical, argument is very similar, it
is interesting to note that this result is applicable to a hidden information framework in
which the private information, on health, is partially observable by the government.
It should be emphasized that the rst-best implementation heavily relies on the as-
sumption that workers believe that their probability of being awarded the tag, conditional
on being able at age RFB, is GA(^). In other words, they do not have any private infor-
mation about whether they will be eligible at RFB. While, as a rst-order approximation
to reality, this assumption is reasonable, a small departure from it could prevent the
implementation of the rst-best policy. Indeed, an able individual whose apparent health
is already very bad at age 50 might be tempted to deviate being condent that he will
get tagged at RFB if the threshold ^ is very high.
While the rst-best implementation result is primarily a theoretical result, it neverthe-
less suggests that the government can obtain substantial welfare gains by moving beyond
the minimization of gaps and leakages. For instance, if, starting from a lower level, the
disability standard was increasing even more rapidly with age than it currently does37,
then the tag would often be awarded later in life. This would be welfare-enhancing as the
threat of not being tagged when old would deter the temptation to claim to be disabled
when young. Moreover, few young and able workers would be tagged which would make
it unnecessary to give them special rewards for participating in the labor market.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized, within a general framework, the optimal Social Se-
curity system in a dynamic setting with imperfectly observable health. In order to induce
the able to work, while providing insurance against disability, the planner o¤ers back-
loaded incentives and makes strategic use of the di¤erence between the age of occurrence
of disability and the age of award of the tag. The able who are tagged should be encour-
aged to work. But, as they are eligible for generous disability benets, it is necessary to
provide them with higher consumption and higher pensions than if they were untagged.
It is therefore also desirable to let them retire earlier than others. Indeed, our simulation
nds a general retirement age of 67.3 for the untagged and close to 62 for those tagged
36See also Varian (1980).
37Note that this implies raising the price of gaps relative to that of leakages as age increases.
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before age 57.
In many industrialized countries, both disability insurance and pension programs are
subject to nancial distress. It is commonly argued that the strictness of the disability
test should be raised, to deal with the former problem, and that the statutory retirement
age should be increased, to deal with the latter. A di¤erent solution emerges when the
two problems are treated jointly rather than in isolation. To increase labor supply, the
key is to o¤er the able and tagged proper incentives to work until some early retirement
age. This would even make it desirable to decrease the strictness of the test which, by
reducing the number of gaps, would improve the provision of insurance against disability.
Moreover, additional welfare gains could be obtained by moving beyond the minimization
of classication errors and by setting the disability standards and consumption levels
strategically.
In this paper, we have derived the optimal incentive-feasible allocation by relying on
the revelation principle. It would now be very interesting to determine how it could
be implemented in a decentralized economy with private capital markets. If the policy
instruments needed for implementation turn out to be excessively complex, then imple-
mentation constraints might have to be added to the planners problem. Diamond and
Mirrlees (1986) showed a potentially useful direction by solving the same problem as in
their previous paper but imposing that the consumption of the able should be constant
over time, reecting the impossibility of implementing age-dependent payroll taxes. Simi-
larly, Diamond and Mirrlees (1995) allowed for hidden private savings within their original
framework. However, to the extent that the main features of our optimal policy could
generate signicant welfare gains, the government should avoid imposing restrictions on
policy instruments that would prevent the realization of these gains. This suggests that
our main qualitative insights would remain relevant, even under reasonable additional
constraints on policy instruments.
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A The planners problem
As explained in the text, cf. (12), the planner maximizes the ex-ante expected lifetime
utility of agents subject to a resource constraint and to a set of incentive compatibility
constraints which ensures that the able choose to work until they reach the relevant
retirement age. In this appendix, we provide the detailed expressions of the planners
problem. His objective, which can be derived by substituting (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)
into (6), is to maximize:
E [v(i; j)] = (A1)Z RU
0
e t

u(cWU(t))  b h1 GA(^t)i [1  F (t)] dt
+
Z RU
0
Z RT (j)
j
e t

u(cWT (t; j))  b gA(^j)d^j
dj
[1  F (t)] dtdj
+
Z RT (0)
0
e t

u(cWT (t; 0))  bGA(^0) [1  F (t)] dt
+
Z RU
0
Z H
i
e tu(cNU(t; i))
h
1 GD(^t)
i
f(i)dtdi
+
Z H
RU
e tu(cNU(t; RU))
hh
1 GA(^t)
i
[1  F (t)] +
h
1 GD(^t)
i
[F (t)  F (RU)]
i
dt
+
Z RU
0
Z H
i
Z H
j
e tdt

u(cNTN (i; j))gD(^j)
d^j
dj
f(i)djdi
+
Z H
RU
Z H
j
e tdt

u(cNTN (RU; j))

"
gA(^j)
d^j
dj
[1  F (j)] +
h
GD(^j) GA(^j)
i
f(j) + gD(^j)
d^j
dj
[F (j)  F (RU)]
#
dj
+
Z RU
0
Z RT (j)
j
Z H
i
e tdt

u(cNTT (i; j))gA(^j)
d^j
dj
f(i)didj
+
Z RT (0)
0
Z H
i
e tdt

u(cNTT (i; 0))GA(^0)f(i)di
+
Z RU
0
Z H
RT (j)
e tdt

u(cNTT (RT (j); j))gA(^j)
d^j
dj
[1  F (RT (j))] dj
+
Z H
RT (0)
e tdt

u(cNTT (RT (0); 0))GA(^0) [1  F (RT (0))]
+
Z RU
0
Z H
j
e tdt

u(cNTT (j; j))
h
GD(^j) GA(^j)
i
f(j)dj:
Note that, when deriving this expression, care should be taken of the fact that f(i; j)
is not a standard probability density function. In particular, a mass of agents become
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disabled and tagged simultaneously. This justies the existence of a specic term, i.e.
the last term of (A1), corresponding to these people.
Similarly, the full expression for the resource constraint is:Z RU
0
e t

cWU(t)  t
 h
1 GA(^t)
i
[1  F (t)] dt (A2)
+
Z RU
0
Z RT (j)
j
e t
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cWT (t; j)  t

gA(^j)
d^j
dj
[1  F (t)] dtdj
+
Z RT (0)
0
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cWT (t; 0)  t

GA(^0) [1  F (t)] dt
+
Z RU
0
Z H
i
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h
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i
f(i)dtdi
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[1  F (t)] +
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1 GD(^t)
i
[F (t)  F (RU)]
i
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Z RU
0
Z H
i
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j
e tdt

cNTN (i; j)gD(^j)
d^j
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The incentive compatibility constraint inducing the able and untagged of age s 2
[0; RU) to work is:Z RU
s
e t

u(cWU(t))  b h1 GA(^t)i [1  F (t)] dt (A3)
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Z RU
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j
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The left hand side is equal to
R H
s
R H
s
vs(i; j)f(i; j)didj = E [vs(i; j)ji > s; j > s]R H
s
R H
s
f(i; j)didj

, while the right hand side is equal to
R H
s
R H
s
vs(s; j)f(i; j)didj =
E [vs(s; j)ji > s; j > s]
R H
s
R H
s
f(i; j)didj

.38 As could be seen from the right hand side
of the constraint, agents who deviate and claim to be disabled get consumption cNU(t; s)
until tagged at j > s and cNTN (s; j) thereafter.
Finally, the able who obtained the tag at age j should be incentivized to work until
38Recall that vs(i; j) denotes the ex-post lifetime utility of individual (i; j) from age s onwards.
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age RT (j). The corresponding constraint at age s  j is:Z RT (j)
s
e t

u(cWT (t; j))  b [1  F (t)] dt (A4)
+
Z RT (j)
s
Z H
i
e tdt

u(cNTT (i; j))f(i)di
+
Z H
RT (j)
e tdt

u(cNTT (RT (j); j)) [1  F (RT (j))]

Z H
s
e tdt

u(cNTT (s; j)) [1  F (s)] :
The left hand side is equal to
R H
s
vs(i; j)f(i)di = E [vs(i; j)ji > s]
R H
s
f(i)di

, while the
right hand side is equal to
R H
s
vs(s; j)f(i)di = E [vs(s; j)ji > s]
R H
s
f(i)di

= vs(s; j)[1 
F (s)].39 Since, once an agent is tagged, the planner cannot rely on any additional infor-
mation about his health, this constraint is formally identical to the incentive compatibility
constraint imposed in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).
The planners problem is to maximize (A1) with respect to cWU(), cWT (), cNU(),
cNTN (), cNTT (), RT () and RU subject to (A2), (A3) 8s 2 [0; RU) and (A4) 8j 2 [0; RU),
8s 2 [j; RT (j)).
B Proof of Proposition 2
The probability that an agent gets tagged at RFB is given by:
f(j = RFBji) =
(
GD(^) if i  RFB
GA(^) if i > RFB
.
It follows, by (31), that the probability that an agent gets tagged immediately after RFB
is equal to:
f(j > RFBji) = 1  f(j = RFBji).
The ex-post lifetime utility of an (i; j) individual who becomes disabled before RFB and
who only gets tagged after RFB, i.e. i < RFB and j > RFB, is given by:
v(i; j) =
Z i
0
e t [u(c)  b] dt+
Z RFB
i
e tu(c)dt+
Z H
RFB
e tu()dt.
39Once an agent is retired and tagged, the occurrence of disability can no longer a¤ect his welfare.
Hence, E [vs(s; j)ji > s] = vs(s; j).
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The ex-post lifetime utility of all other individuals is equal to:
v(i; j) =
Z minfi;RFBg
0
e t [u(c)  b] dt+
Z H
minfi;RFBg
e tu(c)dt.
The ex-ante expected lifetime utility of workers is equal to:
E [v(i; j)] =
Z H
0

v(i; j = RFB)f(j = RFBji) + v(i; j > RFB)f(j > RFBji) f(i)di
=
Z RFB
0
h
v(i; j = RFB)GD(^) + v(i; j > R
FB)
h
1 GD(^)
ii
f(i)di
+
Z H
RFB
h
v(i; j = RFB)GA(^) + v(i; j > R
FB)
h
1 GA(^)
ii
f(i)di
=
Z H
0
e tdt

u(c) 
Z H
RFB
e tdt

[u(c)  u()] [1 GD(^)]F (RFB)
 
"Z RFB
0
Z i
0
e tbdt

f(i)di+
 Z RFB
0
e tbdt
!
1  F (RFB)# .(B1)
Similarly, the resource constraint, E [z(i; j)]  0, can be written as:
Z H
0
e tdt

c 
Z H
RFB
e tdt

[c  ] [1 GD(^)]F (RFB)
 
"Z RFB
0
Z i
0
e ttdt

f(i)di+
 Z RFB
0
e ttdt
!
1  F (RFB)#  0.
Note that the last term, in the square bracket, is the average lifetime production in the
rst-best allocation. It must therefore be equal to the average lifetime consumption in
the rst-best allocation. Hence, the resource constraint can be rewritten as:Z H
0
e tdt

c 
Z H
RFB
e tdt

[c  ] [1 GD(^)]F (RFB) 
Z H
0
e tdt

cFB,
or, equivalently, as:Z H
0
e tdt

c  cFB  Z H
RFB
e tdt

[c  ] [1 GD(^)]F (RFB). (B2)
Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint of the untagged of age t, where t 2
[0; RFB), is:40
E [vt(i; j)ji > t]  E [vt(t; j)ji > t] ,
40As agents cannot be tagged before they reach the retirement age RFB , there is no incentive compat-
ibility constraints for the tagged.
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where vt(i; j) denotes the ex-post lifetime utility of individual (i; j) from age t onwards.
Proceeding as in the derivation of the objective, it can easily be shown that:
E [vt(i; j)ji > t] =
Z H
t
e sds

u(c)
 
Z H
RFB
e sds

[u(c)  u()] [1 GD(^)]F (R
FB)  F (t)
1  F (t)
 
"Z RFB
t
Z i
t
e sbds

f(i)
1  F (t)di+
 Z RFB
t
e sbds
!
1  F (RFB)
1  F (t)
#
.
We also have:
E [vt(t; j)ji > t] =
Z RFB
t
h
vt(t; j = R
FB)GD(^) + vt(t; j > R
FB)
h
1 GD(^)
ii f(i)
1  F (t)di
+
Z H
RFB
h
vt(t; j = R
FB)GA(^) + vt(t; j > R
FB)
h
1 GA(^)
ii f(i)
1  F (t)di
=
Z H
t
e sds

u(c)
 
Z H
RFB
e sds

[u(c)  u()] [1 GD(^)]F (R
FB)  F (t)
1  F (t)
 
Z H
RFB
e sds

[u(c)  u()] [1 GA(^)]1  F (R
FB)
1  F (t) .
Hence, after straightforward simplications, the incentive compatibility constraint for the
untagged of age t is:
Z H
RFB
e sds

[u(c)  u()] [1 GA(^)]

1  F (RFB)

"Z RFB
t
Z i
t
e sbds

f(i)di+
 Z RFB
t
e sbds
!
1  F (RFB)# .
The right hand side of the constraint is decreasing in t, while the left hand side is in-
dependent of t. Hence, if this constraint is satised for t = 0, then it is satised for all
values of t 2 [0; RFB). We can therefore focus on this constraint at time 0, which can be
written as:
[u(c)  u()] [1 GA(^)]  X, (B3)
where, by denition:
X =
hR RFB
0
R i
0
e sbds

f(i)
1 F (RFB)di+
R RFB
0
e sbds
i
R H
RFB
e sds
.
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Note that X > 0.
For any given value of ^, the consumption levels dened by (32), (33) and (34) char-
acterize an incentive-feasible allocation of resources provided that c and  satisfy the
resource constraint (B2) and the incentive compatibility constraint (B3). Let us there-
fore consider that c and  are jointly determined by these two constraints holding with
equality. It immediately follows that, as ^ tends to +1,  tends to 0 and c tends to
cFB.41
Finally, we need to show that welfare converges to its rst-best level. Using the
incentive compatibility constraint (B3), the second term of the objective (B1) can be
written as:Z H
RFB
e tdt

[u(c)  u()] [1 GD(^)]F (RFB) =
Z H
RFB
e tdt

X
1 GD(^)
1 GA(^)
F (RFB).
The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that
h
1 GD(^)
i
=
h
1 GA(^)
i
tends to
0 as ^ tends to +1. It immediately follows that the value of the objective (B1) converges
to its rst-best level as ^ tends to +1.
41The incentive constraint implies that c > . Thus, by the resource constraint c  cFB . For
simplicity, we can write the resource constraint as c  cFB = [c  ]Y where Y 2 [0; 1). This expression
can be rewritten as c    = [cFB   ]=[1   Y ]. We also know that   0, since consumption cannot be
negative. Combining these last four expressions yields 0  c  cFB = [c  ]Y = cFB   Y= [1  Y ] 
cFBY= [1  Y ]. But, Y tends to 0 as ^ tends to innity. Thus, the right hand side of the inequality tends
to 0 and, hence, c tends to cFB as ^ tends to innity. If GA(^) tends to one and u(c) tends to u(cFB),
then the incentive compatibility constraint implies u() must tend to  1. Hence,  tends to 0 as ^ tends
to innity.
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